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MATTIAs Kumm*
ABSTRACT
If the point of constitutionalism is to define the legal framework
within which collective self-government can legitimately take place,
constitutionalism has to take a cosmopolitan turn: it has to occupy itself
with the global legitimacy conditions for the exercise of state sovereignty.
Contrary to widely made implicit assumptions in constitutional theory
and practice, constitutional legitimacy is not self-standing. Whether a
national constitution and the political practices authorized by it are
legitimate does not depend only on the appropriate democratic quality
and rights-respecting nature of domestic legal practices. Instead,
national constitutional legitimacy depends, in part, on how the national
constitution is integrated into and relates to the wider legal and political
world. The drawing of state boundaries and the pursuit of national
policies generates justice-sensitive externalities that national law, no
matter how democratic, can not claim legitimate authority over. It is the
point and purpose of international law to authoritatively address
problems of justive-sensitive externalities of state policies. In this way,
international law helps create the conditions and defines the domain
over which states can legitimately claim sovereignty. States have a
standing duty to help create and sustain an international legal system
that is equipped to fulfill that function. Only a cosmopolitan state-a
state that incorporates and reflects the global legitimacy conditions for
claims to sovereignty in its constitutional structure and foreign policy-is
a legitimate state.
* Inge Rennert Professor of Law, NYU School of Law, Research Professor for "Rule of
Law in the Age of Globalization," WZB Berlin & Humboldt University.
Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies Vol. 20, Issue 2 (2013)
@ Indiana University Maurer School of Law
605
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIEs 20:2
I. THE NATURE OF THE DEBATE ABOUT CONSTITUTIONALISM
It has become widespread for international lawyers to describe
international law as a whole' or specific international regimeS2 as a
constitutional system. Yet, the use of constitutional language for
describing and assessing legal and political practices beyond the state
remains a subject of considerable dispute. 3 Even though the tone and
commitments encountered in these debates suggest that something
important is at stake, it is not entirely clear what the stakes in the
debates about the "magic C-word"4 are. What is this debate about? How
should we understand the intensity and commitment characteristically
associated with the different positions in this debate?
The disagreement is clearly not empirical. Scholars generally agree
about the relevant facts. Nobody doubts that international law evolved
considerably after World War II and again after the end of the Cold
War. It is not disputed that there are features of international law that
bear some resemblance to features associated with domestic
constitutional law. In part, these are formal. There are elements of a
hierarchy of norms in international law. They range from ius cogens
norms-peremptory norms that states may not deviate from even by
Treaty-to Article 103 of the U.N. Charter, establishing the priority of
the U.N. Charter over other agreements. In part, they are functional:
there are multilateral treaties that serve as regime-specific
constitutional charters for institutionally complex transnational
governance practices. And, in part, they are substantive: human rights
1. For representative examples, see generally JAN KLABBERS ET AL., THE
CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2009) (examining to what extent the
international legal system has constitutional features comparable to those found in
national law); Andreas L. Paulus, The International Legal System as a Constitution, in
RULING THE WORLD? CONSTITUTIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE 69 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman eds., 2009) [hereinafter RULING
THE WORLD?] (exploring constitutionalization of the international legal system). For a
brief history of constitutional language in international law, see Bardo Fassbender, 'We
the Peoples of the United Nations'- Constituent Power and Constitutional Form in
International Law, in THE PARADOX OF CONSTITUTIONALISM: CONSTITUENT POWER AND
CONSTITUTIONAL FORM 269, 270-73 (Martin Loughlin & Neil Walker eds., 2007).
2. The focus of the discussions has been on the United Nations, the European Union,
the Word Trade Organization, and the international human rights regime. See RULING
THE WORLD?, supra note 1, at 113-232.
3. See generally NIco KRISCH, BEYOND CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE PLURALIST
STRUCTURE OF POSTNATIONAL LAW (2010) (exploring the limitations of the
constitutionalist approach to the "postnational" legal order); PETER L. LINDSETH, POWER
AND LEGITIMACY: RECONCILING EUROPE AND THE NATION-STATE (2010) (arguing that the
supranational framework of the European Union has failed to achieve constitutional
legitimacy in its own right).
4. See Eric Stein, The Magic of the C-Word, 18 EUSA REV. 1, 1-5 (2005).
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obligations have long pierced the veil of sovereignty that kept the
relationship between the state and its citizens from the purview of
international law. The individual has long emerged as a subject of
rights and obligations under international law. There are international
human rights courts established by treaties that authorize individuals
to vindicate their rights before international courts. International law
even criminalizes certain types of particularly serious human rights
violations. These are features more characteristic of modern
constitutional systems than of the traditional paradigm of international
law as the law among states.
Constitutional skeptics do not deny that international law exhibits
these features, but they insist that this does not justify describing
international law in constitutional terms.5 Constitutionalism, they
insist, is not just connected to certain formalities, functions, or
substantive elements. It is connected to something more ambitious. In
the tradition of the French and American Revolutions, it is a
normatively ambitious project of establishing legitimate authority
among free and equals. A trinitarian commitment to human rights,
democracy, and the rule of law-we might say-is the dogma of the
constitutionalist faith. Legitimate authority in this tradition is widely
believed to require "We the People" as the constituent power
constituting and limiting public power by way of establishing a
constitution that is the supreme law of the land. Constitutionalism is
about establishing legitimate supreme authority for free and equals
engaged in a collective exercise of self-government. There is no genuine
political community on the global level capable of establishing a
democratic system of constitutional self-government. And, given the
absence of a sovereign state on the global level, the institutional
infrastructure that could make such a project effective is also lacking.
So, unless someone is engaged in political advocacy for a global
constitutional state-a normatively contestable and probably practically
futile endeavor for the time being-it is misleading to use the language
of constitutionalism to describe international law.
Superficially, there appears to be an easy way to resolve this debate.
If this were a mere debate about the use of words, we might simply
distinguish between Big C and Small c constitutionalism. Big C
5. Among the most sophisticated skeptics is Dieter Grimm, The Achievement of
Constitutionalism and its Prospects in a Changed World, in THE TWILIGHT OF
CONSTITUTIONALISM? 3 (Petra Dobner & Martin Loughlin eds., 2010). Unlike Grimm,
most skeptics are not scholars focused on thinking hard about international law and its
theoretical foundations, but constitutional scholars comfortably inhabiting the conceptual
and normative domestic constitutional universe in which international law operates
primarily as an irritation, perhaps alarming, but probably best ignored.
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constitutionalism-constitutionalism on the domestic level, involving
"We the People" establishing a constitutional framework of
self-government claiming supreme authority within the framework of
the sovereign state-does not exist beyond the state. Small c
constitutionalism on the other hand-legal practices sharing some
structural features of Big C constitutionalism, but less centralized, more
fragmented, imagined without reference to either "We the People" or a
sovereign state-can and does exist on the international level. Once
such a clarification is made, is there anything more to be said?
But of course, this way of resolving the issue will not satisfy either
side. Big C constitutionalists are skeptical about the claims of
legitimacy that Small c constitutionalists are implicitly making when
they describe international law in constitutional terms. They believe
that constitutional rhetoric is used to cover up what they see as a
significant normative problem with recent tendencies of international
law: the increasing divorce of international law from the legitimating
anchor of state consent.6 Think of the spreading and increasing power of
international institutions, the softening up of the requirements of state
practice for the identification of customary international law, the
emerging of a plethora of courts and tribunals with the jurisdiction to
adjudicate questions of international law, and the increasing tendency
of international human rights law to circumscribe how states should
relate to their citizens. It appears as if the generation and
interpretation of international law is increasingly taken away from the
control of states. States are more and more likely to find themselves
subject to international legal obligations they have not specifically
consented to, and many of those obligations concern regulatory issues or
rights questions traditionally addressed only by domestic institutions.
For Big C constitutionalists, this is a problem because they believe that
the taming of law and politics by way of national constitutional
procedures and constraints constitutes an achievement that is now in
the process of unravelling,7 as international public authority8 is
increasingly exercised outside of the state. The act of state consent is
believed to connect national constitutional values and commitments to
the generation of international law, bestowing whatever legitimacy it
6. See Mattias Kumm, The Legitimacy of International Law: A Constitutionalist
Framework of Analysis, EUR. J. INT'L L. (2004).
7. For a collection of essays exploring this theme, see generally id.
8. For analyses of the spread of international public authority, see generally Jost E.
ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS (2005); DELEGATING STATE
POWERS: THE EFFECT OF TREATY REGIMES ON DEMOCRACY AND SOVEREIGNTY (Thomas M.
Franck ed., 2000); THE EXERCISE OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY BY INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS:
ADVANCING INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW (Armin von Bogdandy et al. eds., 2010).
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might have on it. International law is derivative in regards to
legitimacy. International law derives its legitimacy from the consent of
states. This understanding of the foundation of international law has
significant implications for the interpretation and progressive
development of international law. Insisting on a link to national
institutions in the generation, interpretation, and enforcement of
international legal norms becomes a central preoccupation.9 From this
perspective, the talk of constitutionalism beyond the state misleadingly
tends to cover up both the legitimacy deficit of an international law in
which the link to state consent becomes more attenuated, as well as the
threat this constitutes to the achievements of domestic
constitutionalism.
Conversely, Small c constitutionalists insist that the legitimacy of
international law does not depend on tracing international legal
obligations back to the specific consent of obligated states. Rather, they
insist that the legitimacy of international law is not simply derivative,
but to some extent stands on its own. Both in terms of operation and
legitimacy, the international legal order can be described as an
"autonomous" legal order that should be interpreted and progressively
developed to better realize the constitutional values it is founded on.
At its heart, the debate about the constitutional character of
international law should be understood as a debate about how to
understand the conditions of constitutional legitimacy. Big C
constitutionalists are right about two things. First, constitutionalism
should be understood as a normatively ambitious project of establishing
legitimate authority over persons that are ultimately conceived as free
and equals. This indeed gives rise to the trinitarian formula of the
constitutionalist faith: a commitment to human rights, democracy, and
the rule of law.10 But there is deep and interesting disagreement about
9. This has been the common theme of all "Revisionist" writing on the law of foreign
affairs in the United States. See generally the work of Curtis Bradley, John Yoo, Jack
Goldsmith, and Eric Posner.
10. Note how this concept of constitutionalism is not shared by societal constitutionalists
such as, most prominently, Gunther Teubner. See, e.g., GUNTHER TEUBNER,
CONSTITUTIONAL FRAGMENTS: SOCIETAL CONSTITUTIONALISM AND GLOBALIZATION 1-3 (2012)
(criticizing traditional constitutionalism and its limitations in addressing transnational
constitutional challenges). Teubner's is a sociological, systems-theory informed
understanding of constitutionalism. It is well-equipped to identify cohesively structured
social practices and describe the dynamics and relationships between such practices. Societal
constitutionalism provides a prism that helps normatively-focused constitutionalists develop
a sociologically enriched understanding of the world they are trying to assess. But societal
constitutionalists do not participate in the project of working out the implications of a shared
normative commitment to the idea of free and equals governing themselves through law.
They do not provide an account of constitutionalism that interprets the heritage of the
French and American revolutions for the purpose of gaining a better normative
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how that commitment is to be understood in more concrete terms.
Competing interpretations of the constitutional heritage of the French
and American Revolutions as they relate to international law compete
with one another. Both Big C and Small c constitutionalists share a
common constitutionalist grammar in their understanding of the
conditions of legitimate authority. They may both insist that a
constitutional justification of authority requires public power to be
legally constituted and constrained, appropriately participatory, and
rights-respecting. They disagree, however, about how these ideas should
be worked out when it comes to assessing the relationship between
national and international law. They disagree on whether international
law should be conceived in derivative terms. Is the consent of states the
foundation of international law? Does international law derive its
legitimacy from the consent of states? Should it be a core concern that
international law is interpreted and progressively developed to ensure
that national institutions, the sole conveyers of constitutional
legitimacy, remain in charge? Big C constitutionalists are inclined to
insist on all of these things, whereas international constitutionalists
insist on a negative answer to all of these questions. They insist that a
proper understanding of the constitutional tradition requires
international law to be understood, interpreted, and progressively
developed in a way that allows international legal and political practices
to play a more independent role.
But what role exactly should that be, and how should it be justified
in constitutional terms? Reading the literature, it is relatively clear that
most international constitutionalists tend to favor more international
law, stronger international institutions, more compulsory jurisdiction
for courts, more participatory possibilities for individuals and members
of an international civil society, more mechanisms ensuring respect for
human rights by states, and so forth. However, much of this writing
takes the form of relatively formal arguments analyzing treaties, court
decisions, or legal documents generated by international institutions.
International constitutionalists often assume the posture of
conventional positivist analysts, even as they are believed to be engaged
in a deeply important normative project. On a more abstract level they
tend to be against, or want to move beyond, sovereignty and the
state-indeed, the sovereign state is often the bite noir. They may
understanding of the world of law we inhabit, in order to move it closer to where it should be.
As sociologists, Societal Constitutionalists bracket questions of justice. (Luhmann claimed
that systems theory provided a way to overcome and move beyond questions of justice, which
he referred to as "old-European."). Focusing on the conditions under which justice can be
established between free and equal persons is, however, the core preoccupation of
constitutionalist thinking in the tradition of the French and American Revolutions.
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instead insist on human dignity as the foundation of international law."
And they may point to interdependencies and make functional
arguments about the need to provide global public goods that states
cannot provide by themselves.12 But whereas there is rich and
theoretically sophisticated literature in normative constitutional theory
about the basic institutions and ideas underlying domestic
constitutionalism, as well as how these ideas and institutions connect to
concrete issues and problems, there is relatively little equivalent
literature that brings to bear normatively rich constitutionalist thinking
in international law.
The following sections will begin with an argument that analyzes
what exactly is wrong with Big C constitutionalism in order to develop
some basic ideas about the foundations of public law in the
constitutionalist tradition. Big C constitutionalists are right to connect
the idea of constitutionalism to a normatively ambitious project of
establishing legitimate authority. But the idea of sovereignty as
ultimate authority-a conception of constitutionalism tied to the
coercive institutions of the state and a conception of legitimacy and
democracy reductively tied to the self-governing practices of "We the
People"-is deeply misguided. It aggrandizes and misconstrues national
constitutional practice and sells short legal and political practices
beyond the state. It misconstrues the basic commitments underlying the
constitutionalist tradition of the French and American Revolutions. This
article will then analyze how national and international law have to be
conceived, in constitutional terms, as mutually supportive and
complementary. International lawyers are right to insist on the
constitutional nature of international law. But they should acknowledge
more openly that their construction is ultimately informed by a
competing conception of legitimate authority, one that provides a
different interpretation of the constitutionalist tradition, an
interpretation that is directly in conflict with Big C constitutionalism
and that is considerably more ambitious than Small c constitutionalism.
These lawyers would do well to more strongly emphasize the deep
interdependencies between national and international law.
11. See generally PATRICK CAPPS, HUMAN DIGNITY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2009). The focus on human dignity as the foundation and purpose of
Illinois was also shared by the New Haven School. See generally MYRES S. McDOUGAL ET
AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE BASIC POLICIES OF AN
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN DIGNITY (1980).
12. See generally ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW IN THE
21ST CENTURY: CONSTITUTIONAL PLURALISM AND MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE OF
INTERDEPENDENT PUBLIC GOODS (2012).
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International law is neither derivative, nor is it autonomous. National
and international law form an integrative whole.
II. AGAINST BIG C CONSTITUTIONALISM AND FOR THE COSMOPOLITAN
TURN IN CONSTITUTIONALISM
Contrary to the precepts of Big C constitutionalism, national
constitutional legitimacy is not self-standing. The legitimacy of national
constitutions is not only a matter between "We the People" and the
national constitution. National constitutional legitimacy depends, in
part, on how the national constitution is integrated into and relates to
the wider legal and political world. Domestic constitutional law has to
be embedded in the right way in an appropriately structured
international legal system for it to be legitimate. One of the core
purposes of international law is to create and define the conditions
under which a sovereign state's claim to legitimate authority is justified.
States have a standing duty to help create and sustain such conditions
and an international legal system that is equipped to fulfill that
function. The relationship between domestic and international law is
neither one of derivation nor of autonomy, but of mutual dependence.
National and international law are mutually co-constitutive. The
constitutional legitimacy of national law depends, in part, on being
adequately integrated into an appropriately structured international
legal system. And the legitimacy of the international legal system
depends, in part, on states having an adequate constitutional structure.
The standards of constitutional legitimacy are to be derived from an
integrative conception of public law that spans the
national-international divide.
There can be no self-standing national constitutional legitimacy
because the practice of constitutional self-government within the
framework of the sovereign state raises the problem of justice-relevant
negative externalities.
The fact of interdependence has often been invoked as a generic
argument in favor of international law. But as will become clear,
interdependence itself is not an argument against Big C
constitutionalism or for the development of an international law that
has the features Small c constitutionalists focus on and Big C
constitutionalists tend to be critical of. It may be true that international
law is a means to reap the benefits of better cooperation and
coordination between interdependent actors. But this would merely
provide a functional argument for states to sign up for certain kinds of
international cooperative endeavors. It would not, without further
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argument, undermine the claim to authority that is implicit in Big C
constitutionalism.
The issue is different, however, when not just any externalities, but
justice-sensitive externalities are in play. National sovereigns can claim
no legitimate authority to address questions involving justice-sensitive
externalities unilaterally. Given the fact of reasonable disagreement
between states about how those externalities should be taken into
account, any claim by one state to be able to resolve these issues
authoritatively and unilaterally amounts to a form of domination. It is
the point and purpose of international law to authoritatively resolve
these concerns by way of a procedure that involves the fair participation
of relevantly effected stakeholders, and it is the duty of states to support
and sustain the development of an international law that is able to
effectively fulfill such a function. In the following, I will first discuss
how the presence of justice-sensitive externalities undermines claims to
legitimate national constitutional authority. I will then focus more
closely on three different kinds of externalities, the normative concerns
they raise, and the structure that international law needs to have to be
able to address these concerns adequately.
A. Why Do Justice -Relevant Negative Externalities Undermine Claims
to Legitimate Authority?
There is no doubt that a wide range of national policy choices
implicates justice-sensitive externalities. Consider the following four
examples: first, a state decides to intervene militarily in another state;
second, a state decides to embrace nuclear power stations not far from
state borders and decides on nuclear safety standards that adjacent
states claim are dangerously low; third, a state decides what level of
carbon-dioxide emissions strikes the right balance between concerns
about global warming and economic competitiveness; and, fourth, a
state decides how to allocate resources and sets priorities for law
enforcement to either clamp down or not to clamp down on
transnational organized crime. In all of these cases, outsiders may be
affected in a way that raises concerns about whether their interests
have been appropriately taken into account or whether others have
unjustly burdened them.
Below, I will describe and more closely analyze different kinds of
externalities and the justice-related problems they raise. Here, the
question is what follows from the fact that state policies often have
justice-sensitive external effects. What follows is, first, that a state has
a duty to be aware of those externalities and take them into
consideration when conceiving and implementing national policies to
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avoid doing injustice. This requires state actors to conceive of
themselves as something more than just participants in a practice of
national self-government focused on and concerned with how public
policies affect national constituents. Instead, when enacting policies
that generate justice-sensitive negative externalities, states have a duty
of justice to also act as trustees of humanity.13 For a state's policies to be
just, they need to adequately take into account the legitimate interests
of effected outsiders.
But that alone is not enough. There is a second consequence. The
range of questions over which a state can plausibly claim legitimate
authority is limited to questions that do not raise issues of
justice-sensitive externalities. A constitution established by "We the
People" can only claim legitimate authority over a domain in which
there are no justice-sensitive externalities. If a state does not accept the
restriction of its authority and help support a constitutional system of
international law that is adequately equipped to address these issues, it
would stretch its claim to legitimate authority and, in effect, insist on a
relationship of domination with regard to those who are externally
affected. It is not sufficient for a state to attempt to do justice to
outsiders by way of respecting their legitimate concerns in the
policy-formation process. The existence of external justice concerns
challenges the authority of "We the People" and limits the authority of
national constitutions. Furthermore, it grounds the obligation of a
national community to support, help develop, and subject itself and its
constitutional system to the authority of an appropriately structured
system of international law, which defines the boundaries of legitimate
sovereign authority.
To understand this concept, it is useful to think about the grounds
for legitimate authority in the domestic context. Under what might be
called the "standard account" of legitimate authority within the
constitutionalist tradition of the eighteenth century,14 the starting point
is the problem of establishing just relations between free and equal
persons. The establishment of just relations between people is
continually hampered by two problems. Because of these problems, it is
13. Eyal Benvenisti, Sovereigns as Trustees of Humanity: On the Accountability of
States to Foreign Stakeholders, 107 AM. J. INT'L L. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 7-8),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1863228. See also Anne Peters, Humanity as the A
and D of Sovereignty, 20 EUR. J. INT'L L. 513 (2009) (arguing that the concept of
sovereignty should derive not from the state as such but from the rights and interests of
humanity).
14. These themes are central to the understanding of law in the political philosophy of
Hobbes, Rousseau, and Kant, among others. For a useful overview of these issues, see
SAMANTHA BESSON, THE MORALITY OF CONFLICT: REASONABLE DISAGREEMENT AND THE
LAW 121-203 (2005).
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not sufficient for each actor to publicly profess allegiance to justice, but
requires something more-the subjection to constitutional authority.
Why is that necessary? Can we all not just agree to do the right thing
and get along?
First, there is the problem of motivation. By themselves, individual
actors might not always be motivated to do what justice requires when
they experience a conflict between what they might want to do and what
they might recognize as an obligation of justice. The institutionalization
of a constitutional system seeks to add nonmoral incentives-the threat
of institutionalized sanctions of some kind-to support and stabilize
justice-respecting behavior.15 The threat of sanctions has a double role
in this regard. First, the addressee of the law has an additional
incentive not to defect from a commitment to justice in the face of what
may appear to be other competing interests because of the threat of
sanctions. The threat of sanctions makes it easier to fight weakness of
the will and the temptation to ignore requirements of justice. Second,
the threat of institutionalized sanctions provides an assurance of
reciprocity. The threat assures that an actor seeking to comply with
duties of justice will not end up the "sucker" when, in a reciprocal
relationship, the other side takes advantage of justice-compliant
behavior but refuses to comply with its obligations.
Second, there is an epistemic problem. Even if we assume all
relevant actors to be motivated in the right way, they might still
disagree about what justice actually requires. There is no procedure
that guarantees that even well-informed and appropriately disposed
intelligent actors agree on specific questions of justice. Given
disagreement over questions of justice, appropriately structured
procedures need to be put in place to authoritatively determine what
claims of justice are to be recognized as valid. The alternative would be
to have the more powerful side dictate and enforce its conception of
justice against the weaker side. That, however, would be a form of
domination. It would privilege one side over the other without good
reason.1 6 The actors are, therefore, under an obligation to establish and
subject themselves to a system of constitutional authority that provides
appropriately impartial and participatory procedures to resolve these
disagreements and ensures that the results are not unreasonable, but
are justifiable to all concerned. These, in a highly stylized form, are
some of the key steps for the justification of legitimate authority within
the liberal-democratic constitutionalist tradition.
15. See id.
16. Reasons simply invoking facts about power relationships do not count as good
reasons in the constitutionalist tradition, and both sides, we are assuming, claim to have
justice on their side.
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If the arguments relating to justice-sensitive externalities that are
standard fare in philosophical accounts of the duty of individuals to help
establish and subject themselves to appropriately structured
constitutional authority on the state level are correct, the problem
replicates itself in the relationship between states.' 7 Questions of justice
also arise between independent self-governing actors. These questions
often become contentious because of the interplay between mixed
motivations and epistemic problems, leading to disagreement and
distrust. The history of foreign policy-even of powerful liberal
democracies-provides ample illustrations of disregard and bias against
outside interests, even if it were the case that liberal democracies do a
better job of taking into account those interests than other forms of
government.' 8 Given that statesmen have an incentive to focus on the
concerns of national constituents, the structural bias of national
political processes with regard to questions of justice-sensitive
externalities is obvious enough. Furthermore, even though states are
obligated to do justice with regard to individuals whether or not there
are appropriate assurances of reciprocity,' 9 there are many obligations
under international law that exist only subject to the condition of
reciprocal compliance. 20
Furthermore, the kinds of justice questions that arise in relation to
negative externalities of national policies are clearly issues on which
there is often reasonable disagreement. Even if reasonable people might
agree that the appropriation of territory by way of military force is a
violation of another sovereign's right, what kind of measures may be
used to retaliate against violations of legal obligations by another state?
What kind of weapons may they seek to acquire? What kind of
counterterrorism effort is minimally necessary to meet protective
obligations? What level of pollution of a river is acceptable upstream
given downstream usage? What level of carbon-dioxide emissions is
17. For the first development of this, see IMMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE 128-36
(M. Campbell Smith trans., 1917) (1795).
18. It is reasonably well-established that democracies tend not to go to war with each
other. For an overview of the debate and literature relating to the "Democratic Peace"
thesis, see generally STEVEN PINKER, THE BETTER ANGELS OF OUR NATURE: WHY
VIOLENCE HAs DECLINED (2011). Moreover, there seems to be a correlation between
liberal democracies, opening up markets to participate in the global economy, and the
degree of multilateral legal integration as reflected in membership in international
institutions. Id.
19. This is recognized also under positive international law with regard to certain
obligations. See, e.g., Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res.
56/83, art. 50, Annex, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/56/49 (Vol. 1) (Dec. 12, 2001).
20. In case of noncompliance, a state can take countermeasures, in the form of
nonperformance of its obligations vis-A-vis the noncompliant state. See, e.g., id. arts.
49-53.
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acceptable in light of the consequences of global warming? These kinds
of questions give rise to debates in which actors might reasonably
disagree about what exactly justice requires in a given context.
Because of the pervasiveness of reasonable disagreement, these are
not the kinds of issues that a state's constitutional system, no matter
how internally democratic, can claim legitimate constitutional authority
over. Claiming authority to resolve questions of justice concerning
outsiders, who per definition have no equal standing in the domestic
policy formation process, is an act of domination. The enforcement of a
conception of justice by a powerful actor or a hegemonic coalition of
actors against others making competing claims is an act of domination if
those hegemonic actors refuse to subject themselves to an impartial
procedure providing equal participatory opportunities for those whose
reasonable justice claims are implicated. With regard to issues
concerning justice-sensitive externalities, each state is under a standing
obligation to support, help further develop, and subject itself to a
constitutional system of international law that is equipped to
authoritatively address these issues. Such a system would have to
provide an impartial and appropriately participatory procedure to
resolve these issues in a way that is reasonable and justifiable to all
concerned. The point of such a system of international law is to define
the domain over which states can legitimately exercise sovereignty and
"We the People" can claim self-governing constitutional authority.
B. Three Kinds of Externalities
Given the centrality of justice-sensitive externalities for
understanding the limits of national constitutional authority and the
purpose of international law, a closer analysis of the concept and its
main practical manifestations are in order. More specifically, I will
distinguish between three kinds of externalities. Each type of
externality raises distinct normative concerns and accounts for specific
structural features of international law. Here, it must suffice to describe
these externalities, the kinds of justice concerns they raise, and the
basic features that international law must have to adequately address
them.
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1. Establishment of borders
The first kind of justice-sensitive negative externality is structural.
It is linked to the fact that a people governing itself within the
institutional framework of the state requires the establishment of
borders. The claim to self-government-to use the territory within the
state borders as is deemed desirable by "We the People" organizing their
lives together-has an external corollary in the claim to a collective
right to exclude others from crossing the borders and entering. 21 States
generally claim a sovereign right to freely determine whom they let in
and whom they refuse to let in. Importantly, this restricts the liberty of
those intending to cross a state boundary and seeking to move to the
territory of another state, whether to find a better life for themselves or
any other reason. How can such exclusion be justified? What justifies
the coercive force someone might encounter at the border when they
seek to enter without meeting whatever requirements happened to have
been established nationally?
The claim to sovereignty over territory by "We the People" can be,
and has been, analogized to the claims to property over land by
individuals in a domestic society, claiming the right to exclude others
from its use. Generally, arguments in favor of a world divided into
distinct and separate sovereign states focus on an array of benefits for
assigning special responsibility to a group of persons to a specific piece
of land.22 This is not the place to engage the rich literature on these
issues. But any successful justification for a right to exclude outsiders
seeking entry satisfies the Lockean proviso that there has to be "enough
and as good left in common for others."23 Even though every
21. This issue has spurned a rich literature in recent years. See generally AYELET
SHAcHAR, THE BIRTHRIGHT LOTTERY: CITIZENSHIP AND GLOBAL INEQUALITY (2009); David
Miller, Immigrants, Nations, and Citizenship, 16 J. POL. PHIL. 371 (2008); Mathias Risse,
On the Morality of Immigration, 22 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 25 (2008).
22. See generally DAVID MILLER, ON NATIONALITY (1995); JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF
PEOPLES (1999).
23. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 175 (1974). This Lockean Proviso
was reintroduced into the modern debate about the original appropriation of property by
Nozick's work and refers to John Locke's argument in the Second Treatise of Government
that the recognition of a right to appropriation of property did not do injustice to others
now precluded from making use of the appropriated land. Id. at 174-82. Locke argues as
follows: "Nor was this appropriation of any parcel of land, by improving it, any prejudice to
any other man, since there was still enough, and as good left; and more than the yet
unprovided could use. So that, in effect, there was never the less left for others because of
his enclosure for himself: for he that leaves as much as another can make use of, does as
good as take nothing at all. No body could think himself injured by the drinking of another
man, though he took a good draught, who had a whole river of the same water left him to
quench his thirst: and the case of land and water, where there is enough of both, is
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appropriation of property is a diminution of another's rights to it, it is
justifiable for so long as it does not make anyone worse off than they
would have been without the possibility of such appropriation. The
standard of "as good" in the context of claiming exclusion from
territorially-based practices of self-government requires that the person
denied entry must have access to the territory of a state where, at the
very least, his or her rights are not violated in a serious way. In order to
justify excluding someone from a state, that person must have access to
some other state that does not violate his or her rights. Anything else
could not plausibly qualify as good enough in the relevant sense. If State
A meets this requirement, it succeeds in creating the preconditions for
the legitimate assertion of State B to exclude those individuals from
State A seeking entry into B. When, in a concrete situation, an
individual finds herself subject to a state that clearly does not fulfill its
sovereign obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill her rights and then
decides to exercise her right to exit that state and to seek entry
elsewhere, it is not clear how the exclusion of such a person could be
justified.
Thinking about borders and the right to exclude in this way helps to
highlight the importance of two core features of international law. On
the one hand, international law seeks to create the conditions for the
legitimate exercise of the right of a sovereign to exclude. All states are
required by international law to respect, protect, and fulfill the human
rights of those subject to their jurisdiction. On the other hand,
international law limits the sovereign right to exclude in cases where
these conditions are not met, particularly in the case of refugees. 24 Note
how this way of conceiving of international human rights law provides a
hard ground for why international law concerns itself with how states
relate to their citizens. We must strive to ensure that rights are
respected everywhere, not just to promote solidarity with all members of
the human community, but also because it is in our interest to ensure
that the necessary preconditions for justifying our national exclusionary
practices are met.
perfectly the same." JOHN LOCKE, SEcOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 33(C.B.
Mcpherson ed., Hacket Publ'g Co. 1980) (1690).
24. See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 1, July 2, 1951, 189
U.N.T.S. 137. Art. 1 as amended by the 1967 Protocol of United Nations Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees defines a refugee as a person who, "owing to
well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the
protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country
of his former habitual residence . .. is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return
to it." Id.
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2. Justice sensitive externalities of national policy
Besides the fact that states establish borders and claim the right to
exclude, there are justice-relevant externalities related to states
implementing national policies, burdening outsiders with harms, and
threatening harm or risks. These externalities range from the obvious to
the more subtle. On the obvious end of the spectrum, there are states
that embrace an aggressive, expansionist foreign policy. An imperial
policy of domination and expansion subverting the political and
territorial independence of neighbors is obviously not justified, even
when such a policy enjoys widespread democratic support in the
aggressor state and that state has a well-structured national
constitutional system. Less obvious examples raise significantly more
pervasive concerns and do not concern foreign policy directly. Think of
the establishment of nuclear power plants near the border with
insufficient safety standards applied by the jurisdiction that these
reactors are stationed in. Or, think about carbon-dioxide emission
standards that contribute to global warming. While the detrimental
effects of these standards may be moderate in the polluting jurisdiction,
that pollution may lead to severe droughts that cause starvation, severe
flooding that results in the forced relocation of millions, or even the
wholesale sinking of island-states in other jurisdictions. Less
dramatically, imagine an upriver riparian state polluting a river to such
an extent that it imposes severe harms downstream within the territory
of the downriver state. Finally, and more subtly, extraterritorial effects
raising justice concerns may also be connected to states failing to
exercise their responsibility to prevent their territory from being used
as a base to organize, plan, and inflict harm in other jurisdictions by
other actors. Justice concerns are not merely raised by negative
externalities of state action, but also by omissions that result in the
failure to realize positive externalities when the state has a
responsibility to act. Here, the issues raised include failing to undertake
adequate counter-terrorism efforts by effectively granting safe harbor to
terrorist organizations or failing to crack down on other forms of
organized crime.
Given that these are areas in which states lack legitimate authority
to effectively control what may or may not be done, there is no injustice
done to states when they are subjected to legal obligations without
having consented to them. On the contrary, there are deep legitimacy
questions connected to the capacity of individual states to effectively
veto the emergence of universally binding obligations in contexts where
the behavior of an individual state raises justice-sensitive externality
concerns. Thankfully, international law has developed capacities to
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generate universally binding legal obligations that overcome the
blocking power of individual states that refuse to give their consent.
With regard to the use of force and questions of peace and security, the
U.N. Security Council has interpreted its competencies broadly and
functions, albeit often unsatisfactorily, as a world legislator operating
by qualified majority vote in areas concerning threats to international
peace and security. 25 Furthermore, in many cases involving these types
of concerns, 26 international courts and tribunals have interpreted the
requirements for customary international law (CIL) in a way that
reflects the underlying purpose of international law. When
justice-sensitive externalities are in play, judges tend to interpret the
requirements of CIL as if these requirements reflect the idea of a
decentralized informal quasi-legislative qualified- maj oritarian process,
not the idea of implied consent by states. 27 The real problem in this area
is not that there is no state consent requirement for obligations to be
generated. There is no problem when, instead of consent, there is a fair
procedure involving adequate participatory procedures for states that
can generate new obligations. The real problem is the extent to which
powerful states remain in a position to veto jurisgenerative efforts. The
veto claimed and exercised by the five permanent members in the
Security Council raises more legitimacy issues than any erosion of the
consent requirement. To address these concerns, creative interpretative
proposals aimed at qualifying the veto right and narrowing the capacity
of individual states to block otherwise universally binding decisions
point in the right direction. 28
25. See Stefan Talmon, The Security Council as World Legislature, 99 AM. J. INT'L L.
175, 175 (2005).
26. See Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary
International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 757 (2001) (arguing that the
standards for determining whether CIL exists with regard to a particular issue might be
sensitive to the particular function that international law needs to fulfill in the respective
area). For similar ideas focused on the role of national courts engaging international law
more generally, see also Eyal Benvenisti, Reclaiming Democracy: The Strategic Uses of
Foreign and International Law by National Courts, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 241 (2008).
27. The legitimating idea of consent of states in international law could be analogized
to the idea of consent in domestic constitutional theory. Individuals are subject to the laws
of the land, whether or not they have explicitly or implicitly consented to them. Consent is
only relevant in the sense that liberal political philosophy refers to: the idea of "reasonable
consent" remains an operative ideal standard for assessing claims of justice. Actual
consent matters only in a limited domain, where individuals are in authority and can
control the obligations they have with regard to others: the domain of private law
contracts.
28. See, e.g., Peters, supra note 13, at 539-40 (arguing that a veto cast under certain
circumstances should be regarded as null and void).
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3. Externalities of national policies that do not raise justice
concerns
All the examples above describe externalities that raise justice
concerns. A wide range of externalities, however, do not. Outsiders have
no claim of justice against a state's political community to generally take
into account their well-being when making a decision that has external
effects. Outsiders have a right not to be unjustly harmed by a state, but
those governing themselves within the framework of the state have a
right not to be required to make themselves an instrument of the
well-being of others. Much could be said about why this is so and what
exactly follows from this, 29 but here it must suffice to put forward a
couple of basic distinctions and examples for illustrative purposes.
First, the failure to realize positive externalities-an omission by a
state-is a justice concern only in cases where there is a positive duty of
justice for the state to act. A state is under a positive duty, for example,
to ensure there are no harms emanating from its territory.30 Here, the
relevant externalities concern justice claims by outsiders.31
There is no general duty of a state, however, to take into account
and further the welfare of outsiders in the same way they would
insiders. When debating whether more money should be spent on social
security to strengthen those that are weakest in domestic society, it is
not plausible to insist that first money has to be spent to raise the level
of those worst off globally up to that of those worst off nationally. It does
not constitute unjustified discrimination that national social security
benefits are not available to every person on the globe. Nor is a state
acting in a way that raises justice concerns when it adopts a national
economic policy that is focused on increasing national welfare, but that
has a more dubious global effect. States are not under a general duty to
ensure that outsiders benefit as much from state policies as nationals.
They are trustees of humanity only to the extent outsiders can make
plausible claims of justice that a state is required to respect. Beyond
that, states have special obligations toward their own citizens and
rightly make their well-being the paramount concern.
29. For a discussion of the role of deontological restrictions in various areas of the law,
see generally Mattias Kumm & Alec D. Walen, Human Dignity and Proportionality:
Deontic Pluralism in Balancing (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory
Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 13-03, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com
/abstract=2195663.
30. For a good overview on the way this principle operates in the area of environmental
international law, see generally Julio BARBOZA, THE ENVIRONMENT, RISK AND LIABILITY
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2011).
31. This is also true when those harms are brought about not directly by state action,
but by private actors, such as terrorists or other forms of organized crime.
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Second, even the infliction of negative externalities does not always
constitute a justice-sensitive externality. There is no injustice done to
outsiders, for example, when a state engages in protectionist policies
and denies or prohibitively taxes market access of certain goods and
services. There is no justice claim against another political community
to make itself a means for realizing economic benefits for others. Even if
a state, at time T1, opened its borders for certain trades and, later, at
time T2, unilaterally closed them again, thus imposing severe losses on
outside traders who had relied on making such trades, these are not
negative externalities that raise justice concerns. Just like a shopkeeper
has no claim of justice against a patron who decides from one day to the
next to no longer patronize his shop, the importer has no claim to justice
against a state deciding to close its borders to a certain kind of trade. In
these types of cases the actions of one state merely changes the
circumstances another state finds itself in.32
When there is a high level of interdependence-situations in which
subjects mutually find themselves subjected to the infliction of
externalities by outsiders-states have an interest to coordinate policies
and cooperate with one another to maximize the welfare of their
constituents and ensure pareto-optimal policies. This is, of course, what
most countries have done across a wide range of goods and services to
mutually profit from more open markets within the context of the World
Trade Organization (WTO) or other regional trade regimes. Once a
country has legally committed itself bi- or multilaterally to grant access
to certain goods and services, the situation changes. In such a context,
the negative externalities connected to a failure to comply with
contractual obligations generally constitute justice-relevant harms. But
they do so only because of violations of agreed commitments and not
independently from such commitments. In such a context, voluntary
legal commitments are constitutive of plausible justice claims.
This, then, is the proper domain of consent-based interactional
treaty law. Here, treaties are the functional equivalent of private law
contracts in domestic law. Consent is not the foundation of international
law, but there is a domain in which sovereign states can claim to be free
to do as they deem fit and subject themselves only to obligations they
have freely accepted. There is a domain in which consent is rightly
regarded as constitutive of legal obligations. This is the domain over
which a sovereign has authority.
Note, however, that the exact scope of that domain may not only be
contested, but may even be unstable. Whether externalities are justice
32. See, e.g., ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM: KANT'S LEGAL AND POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY (2009).
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sensitive is not always a simple issue. Agreements of a certain density
and duration may well become the source of associational moral duties
that go beyond the specific terms of the agreement. The more dense and
more demanding mutually agreed upon frameworks of cooperation are,
the more demanding the justice obligations that flow from such a
practice are. 33 What justice requires is, to some extent, practice
dependant.34
In practice, this means that, much like in private contract law,
freedom of contract is and should be constrained and structured by
other, not necessarily consent-based, legal norms seeking to further
justice or welfare-enhancing policies. It would suggest, furthermore, a
hierarchical relationship between international legal obligations
understood to fall within the domain of this private law paradigm and
international legal obligations more appropriately interpreted as
quasi-legislative. But, whereas in domestic law, contracts between
individuals are generally void when they are in violation of general legal
rules, the situation is more complex in international law. While states
cannot validly enter into treaties violating ius cogens norms, 35 all duties
established under the U.N. Charter take precedence over other treaty
obligations, 36 and bilateral treaties cannot change the general legal
obligations a state is under with regard to third parties.37 Yet, there is
no general rule that invalidates bilateral treaties that are in violation of
quasi-legislative multilateral treaties or rules of customary
international law seeking to realize global public goods.
But notwithstanding these and other complexities, which could
barely be gestured to here, the point is that not all negative
externalities of national policies raise justice concerns. Interdependence
alone is not itself sufficient to establish the duty of a national
community to take into account the effects of their actions on outsiders.
Only justice-relevant externalities can do SO. 38
33. See generally Andrea Sangiovanni, Solidarity in the European Union: Problems
and Prospects, in PHILOSOPHIcAL FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN UNION LAW 384 (Julie
Dickson & Pavlos Eleftheriadis eds., 2012).
34. See Miriam Ronzoni, The Global Order: A Case of Background Injustice? A
Practice-Dependent Account, 37 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 229, 230-31 (2009). See also
Sangiovanni, supra note 33, at 409, n.70.
35. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
[hereinafter Vienna Convention].
36. U.N. Charter art. 103; Vienna Convention, supra note 35, art. 30, 1 1.
37. Vienna Convention, supra note 35, art. 30, IT 4-5.
38. How exactly this distinction is best fleshed out and made operable lies beyond the
scope of this article. See generally RIPSTEIN, supra note 32.
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III. CRITICISMS AND THE CHALLENGE OF SOCIETAL CONSTITUTIONALISM
The idea of self-government of free and equals lies at the heart of
the tradition of liberal-democratic constitutionalism. The guiding ideal
of global order this gives rise to is a world of liberal democratic
constitutional states, collectively subjected to the authority of
international law. 39 The point of international law is to authoritatively
define the conditions under which sovereigns can govern themselves as
well as provide the legal space for sovereigns to coordinate their
activities and cooperate as they deem fit. The relationship between
domestic and international law is neither one of derivation nor of
autonomy, but of mutual dependence. National and international law
are mutually co-constitutive. The constitutional legitimacy of national
law depends, in part, on being adequately integrated into an
appropriately structured international legal system. And the legitimacy
of the international legal system depends, in part, on states having an
adequate constitutional structure. The standards of constitutional
legitimacy are to be derived from an integrative conception of public law
that spans the national-international divide.
What this article has tried to do is to provide a rough general
outline for the reconstruction of the foundations of contemporary public
law. Many of the core structural features of international law can be
explained and justified by reference to the cosmopolitan construction of
public law described here: the role of human rights law, the emergence
of multi-lateral global governance practices, the emancipation of
international law from the strictures of state consent, the functional
reconceptualization of sovereignty in terms of responsibilities and
participation, as well as the constructive constitutional engagement of
liberal democracies with international law. Yet, these are exactly the
features that Big C constitutionalists point to as symptomatic of
international law's legitimacy deficit, features of international law that
threaten democratic constitutionalism. But all of that is mistaken.
Tying together a commitment of self-government, democracy, the state,
sovereignty, and supreme legal authority in this way, Big C
constitutionalism misguidedly aggrandizes the authority of sovereign
states to the detriment of international law. Those who engage
international law through the prism of such a theory seek to
interpretatively connect international law more closely to the consent of
states and the enforcement of international law to the political
endorsement of national political majorities. Doing so not only assumes
39. See KANT, supra note 17. See also Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a
World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J. INT'L L. 503 (1995).
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that "We the People," organizing themselves within the boundaries of a
state, can establish the kind of self-standing authority that they cannot.
It also prevents international law from fully developing its potential to
help create and define the preconditions for the exercise of legitimate
sovereignty. Big C constitutionalism is a misguided interpretation of the
constitutionalist tradition. It sells short the cosmopolitan perspective
inherent in the idea of self-government of free and equals and
misunderstands the demanding task of international law-to first
establish the conditions under which a state's claim to sovereignty can
be legitimate.
As is appropriate for a reconstructive account of the foundations of
existing international law, the assumptions underlying the argument
presented here are largely conventional. The argument takes for
granted a commitment to the principle of sovereign equality of states. It
does not engage the idea of a world state or any other institutionally
transformative project, but takes as a given the commitments to
self-government and sovereign equality as they are inscribed in a
number of foundational norms in international law.
Critics may charge that the focus on the state misses fundamental
features of actual legal practice. Societal constitutionalists in particular
might point to forms of sectorial private ordering in the world economy
that are not captured by what remains a state-focused account of public
law.40 IS it a coincidence that the paper does not mention any of the
genuinely constitutional questions relating to data-gathering of major
Internet companies, the regulatory structure of the banking system, or
the legitimacy issues arising out of the emergence of a largely state-free
administrated system of lex mercatoria? The response to this challenge
is twofold.
First, questions of private ordering do indeed raise constitutional
issues. When states establish global markets though bilateral and
multilateral treaties, they face a challenge to ensure that economic
practices taking place within the framework of private contractual and
self-regulatory norms do not develop destructive tendencies that
unjustly impose costs on outsiders. The financial crisis from 2008
onwards, and the regulatory responses that have followed, should
indeed be regarded as a challenging constitutional case study for the
assessment of global private ordering. Societal constitutionalists are
right to insist that traditional constitutionalists, even those writing
about international law in constitutionalist terms, tend to neglect
questions of private ordering.
40. See TEUBNER, supra note 10, at 8-9.
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I am more skeptical and am not sure how to understand the claim
made by Teubner that these challenges present themselves and should
be thought about as existing outside of the institutionalized sector of
politics. 41 Why is the challenge not to appropriately institutionalize
adequately participatory political processes that allow for these issues
to be addressed? Why would the kind of constitutionalist approach
alluded to here not provide the right kind of critical conceptual
framework? Take as an example the banking crisis. In part, the crisis
was the result of bad domestic regulation, which, in principle, can be
fixed by good domestic regulation. This is simply a case of policy failure.
Of course, given the global structure of financial markets, the
significant externalities of systemic banking failures in major
economies, and collective action problems in the context of regulatory
competition, the case for state cooperation and partial establishment of
international standards or guidelines is strong. This is something the
Basel Committee has done, the G-20 has discussed but failed to do, and
the European Union has been actively pursuing.42 Of course there is
much that could be said in assessing the adequacy of these venues and
the procedures used from a constitutionalist perspective. Furthermore,
any critical perspective would highlight the mistaken economic
assumptions that have informed deregulation and models of
risk-management in previous decades, as well as point to the capture of
regulatory institutions by banks and a global banking class. All of this is
clearly of great importance. What is less clear is how the banking crisis,
or other questions relating to the constitutional structure of private
order, challenges the kind of constitutional perspective developed here. 43
There are a number of other central issues the article has not
grappled with. It has not spelled out exactly what the consequences of
embracing the integrated conception of public law are for the
41. Id. at 1-14.
42. The Third Basel Accord (or Basel III) is a global, voluntary regulatory standard on
bank capital adequacy, stress testing, and market liquidity risk. It was drawn up by the
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision after the financial crisis in 2010-2011. In June
2012, the EU Commission introduced a proposal for a Directive establishing a framework
for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms, allowing for
troubled financial institutions to be wound down. See Proposal for a Directive of the
European Parliament and of the Council (COM(2012) 280/3), EuR. CoMM'N, available at
http://ec.europa.eulinternal-market/bank/docs/crisis-management/2012 eu_framework/CO
M_2012_280.en.pdf.
43. For a discussion of the European financial crisis informed by the constitutionalist
paradigm defended here, see Mattias Kumm, What Kind of a Constitutional Crisis Is
Europe In and What Should Be Done About It? (Soc. Sci. Research Ctr. Berlin, Discussion
Paper No. SP IV 2013-801, 2013), available at
http:/fbibliothek.wzb.eu/pdf/2013/iv13-801.pdf (the report was requested by and was part
of a testimony before the European Parliament's Committee on Constitutional Affairs).
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interpretation and progressive development of international law in any
particular domain. It has not traced the implications of an integrative
conception of constitutionalism for the adequate structure of the
constitutional law of foreign affairs. 44 It has not made much of what is
often described as the fragmentization of international law, with
different legal regimes following their own internal rationality with
relative disregard for the outside. Nor has it addressed the question
about whether and on what grounds it is plausible to believe that an
international law that meets constitutionalist requirements can be
effective. More specifically, it has not addressed the question of what
follows from the fact that the world of states is not confined to
established liberal democracies, but also includes powerful and less
powerful authoritarian regimes, new and old democracies struggling
with authoritarian nationalist tendencies, developing democracies with
deep postcolonial suspicions of an ambitious international law, and a
considerable number of failed or failing states. These are important
questions that need to be addressed.
The point of this article, however, is considerably more modest. It
seeks to discredit certain basic widespread ideas relating to the
self-standing nature of domestic constitutional authority, tying together
"We the People", self-government and state sovereignty, that have
shaped and continue to shape the legal imagination of constitutional
lawyers. Those who embrace these ideas tend to settle into a dogmatic
slumber of self-congratulatory hubris with regard to the achievements
of national constitutionalism, while promoting skepticism about
international law. They attribute legitimacy to domestic constitutional
practices that should raise concerns about domination and disregard of
outsiders' claims. They impose limits on what international law might
become in the name of deeply misunderstood ideas of democratic
legitimacy. And they fail to take seriously international law for what it
already is-an integral part of our highly imperfect constitutional
universe.
44. See Mattias Kumm, The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: On the
Relationship Between Constitutionalism in and Beyond the State, in RULING THE WORLD?
CONSTITUTIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 1, at
258.
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